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Protecting the Individual Rights of NFL Players as
Private Sector Employees
Frederick Vranizan
“It is a privilege to be a part of the National Football League” –
NFL Personal Conduct Policy1

AUTHOR’S NOTES
Some of the subject matter of this article, and its underlying impetus, has
been the subject of much debate for the last several years. Spurred by partisan
politics and misinformation, the National Anthem debate that started when
Colin Kaepernick knelt for the national anthem has become overwhelmingly
divisive. Since then, the conversation has devolved into two camps, one side
screaming that to protest a symbol of our country is to disrespect every
veteran and active service member that has worked to keep it safe, and the
other insisting that free speech should protect a player’s right to protest
deadly and discriminatory police treatment of people of color in the US. 2 The
disconnect between these two arguments, and the polarizing figures which
have galvanized them, has done little more than add to the chasm that exists
in our already divided political world. Unfortunately, rather than address the
issues presented, sports fans and politicians have cemented themselves firmly
on one side or the other of an unwinnable dispute.

* Note that at the time of this writing, the league was still under the 2011 CBA. However,
the new CBA, which will take effect for the 2020 season, still does not address any of the
issues covered here.
1
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY, LEAGUE POLICIES FOR
PLAYERS, 1 (2016), https://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/photo/2017/08/11/
0ap3000000828506.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VBU-ABR8].
2
Jane Coaston, 2 Years of NFL Protests, Explained, VOX (Sep. 4, 2018, 12:10 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2018/8/15/17619122/kaepernick-trump-nfl-protests-2018
[https://perma.cc/V9FK-S3AJ].
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While it may be tempting to wade into the weeds of the “national anthem
debate,” picking a side would serve no purpose other than to pay lip service
to one argument or the other. Additionally, to do so would mean continuing
to overlook some of the fundamental issues that NFL players deal with as
private sector employees and members of their union, the NFL Players
Association (NFLPA). As has been exemplified by the recent failed National
Anthem Rule and litigation involving some of the biggest names in football,
this article will highlight how NFL players are subject to vague and biased
rule-making and enforcement concerning conduct outside the field of play.
This article will then propose changes to both the NFL Collective Bargaining
Agreement and the structure of the rulemaking and enforcement processes to
protect individuals from the unfair practices that currently exist in the NFL.
Because the structures of the NFL and the current rule-making and
enforcement schemes are necessarily rule-intensive, this article attempts to
provide a comprehensive description of how they work and the ways in which
they are dysfunctional. As will be shown, the current rule-making scheme is
rife with both conflicts of interest and incentives to maintain rules, on and off
the field, that are intentionally vague and allow for an unfairly biased
discipline to be levied against players. This process allows for
implementation of rules that are inherently unfair to players, which may or
may not violate their rights under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, and
subjects the League and its players to unnecessary grievances and litigation.
Similarly, this article will show that the disciplinary process which currently
exists as part of the Collective Bargaining Agreement is also inherently
biased and frequently fails to meet the requirements of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement or legal standards. As such, this article will advocate
for a comprehensive change to both the rulemaking and disciplinary systems,
with a mind to protect players’ rights and the integrity of the NFL as a whole.
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I.
INTRODUCTION TO NFL RULEMAKING AND
ENFORCEMENT
A.

The Current Rulemaking Scheme
Currently, all rule changes concerning conduct on and off the field must

be approved by a three-fourths consensus vote of the executive committee of
the NFL.3 The executive committee consists of one representative from each
team, usually the owner or an executive.4 The powers of the executive
committee are derived from Article VI of the Constitution and Bylaws of the
NFL.5 Article XI of the Constitution and Bylaws requires that any proposed
changes to the rules must be submitted, in writing, to the League at least
fifteen days prior to “the Annual Meeting or a recessed session thereof.”6 An
exception to this deadline applies when a recommendation is made by
unanimous approval of any League-appointed committee with authority to
propose rules to the executive committee.7 Under these circumstances,
recommendations require only twelve hours of notice before a vote. 8
Committees are created, and their members are appointed, by the
Commissioner under Article VI of the Bylaws and Constitution as the League
deems necessary.9 Similarly, committees “act under the direction and
chairmanship of the Commissioner, who shall be a member ‘ex-officio’ of
each committee.”10 The two most prescient committees in existence are the
Competition Committee and the Conduct Committee, which are the focus of
3

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, Governance, League Governance (last visited Nov.
20, 2018), https://operations.nfl.com/football-ops/league-governance/
[https://perma.cc/2U6Q-D88L].
4
Id.
5
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 23 (rev. 2006), https://onlabor.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/co_.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY5C-DTH7].
6
Id. at 48.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
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the changes suggested in this article. According to the NFL, “[t]he
Competition Committee reviews all competitive aspects of the game,
including (but not limited to) playing rules, roster regulations, technology,
game-day operations and player protection.”11 In lay-terms, this means that
the Competition Committee deals with the rules of the game, regulations
regarding the number and type of players a team can employ, rules about
what kind of technology teams can use during games, player safety rules, and
all other rules regarding player and personnel actions on gameday. Currently
the Competition Committee is made up of eight members, two team-owners,
two team presidents, two general managers, and two head coaches. 12
The Conduct Committee, on the other hand, deals exclusively with
conduct that is “detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the
NFL.”13 The NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy was most recently updated in
2016, and states that,
To ensure that this policy remains current and consistent with best
practices and evolving legal and social standards, the Commissioner
has named a Conduct Committee. This committee will be made up
of NFL owners, who will review this policy at least annually and
recommend any appropriate changes in the policy, including
investigatory practices, disciplinary levels or procedures, or service
components. The committee will receive regular reports from the
disciplinary officer, and may seek advice from current and former
players, as well as a broad and diverse group of outside experts
regarding best practices in academic, business, and public sector
settings, and will review developments in similar workplace policies
in other settings.14

11

The NFL Competition Committee, League Governance, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
(last visited Nov. 21, 2018), https://operations.nfl.com/football-ops/leaguegovernance/the-nfl-competition-committee/ [https://perma.cc/4FT4-YLGD].
12
Id.
13
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 1.
14
Id.
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Currently, there are eight members of the Conduct Committee: four team
owners; two team executives, both of whom happen to be the children of
owners; and two retired players, both of whom have a minority interest in an
NFL team.15
B.

The Current Enforcement Scheme
At this time, the NFL enforces rules through a two-part system similar to

the committee scheme of rule creation, but with a distinct difference. For ingame rules not pertaining to detrimental conduct, the Football Operations
compliance team, appointed by the Commissioner, reviews potential
infractions.16 The compliance team looks for infractions that were
collectively bargained for by the NFL and NFLPA, and which are contained
in the schedule of fines that the NFL updates and publishes every season.17
Should the compliance team determine that a player has violated one of the
specified rules, that player is informed of their breach and given a video and
explanation of why they are being fined.18 Then, players are presented with
an opportunity to protest the decision.19 Should a player choose to appeal the
fine, their case is randomly assigned to one of the League’s appeals officers,
who reviews the play, listens to both the League’s and the player’s
arguments, and makes a final, binding decision.20 Both of the appeals officers
currently hearing fine protests are former NFL players, appointed and paid
by the NFL and the NFLPA jointly.21
15

Minding the League’s Business: NFL Committee Assignments, SPORTS BUSINESS
JOURNAL (Sep. 5. 2016),
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2016/09/05/InDepth/Committees.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y7F6-JTWR].
16
Fines and Appeals, Enforcement, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE (last visited Nov. 21,
2018),
https://operations.nfl.com/football-ops/nfl-rules-enforcement/fines-appeals/
[https://perma.cc/2XU5-EH8S].
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
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For both on- and off-the-field player conduct that is not covered
specifically by the NFL play rules, a determination of whether conduct is
“detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the NFL” is made
according to the NFL Personal Conduct Policy.22 When the League office
becomes aware of a potential violation of the Personal Conduct Policy, an
investigation into the violation is conducted, either by NFL Security, a third
party, or both.23 Additionally, when criminal actions are implicated, the
League attempts to cooperate with law enforcement during the League
investigation.24 Upon completion of the initial investigation, a disciplinary
officer, appointed by the Commissioner, will complete a report detailing the
findings and, at the Commissioner’s request, will include a recommendation
for appropriate discipline.25 Players who may be subject to discipline under
the Personal Conduct Policy are given an opportunity to submit a written
rebuttal to the report prepared by the disciplinary officer and are given access
to any information collected in the course of the investigation.26 In cases
where there has been a legal finding of facts, or a judgment on the merits, the
court’s findings and judgment are binding on the investigation. 27 The
Commissioner himself then reviews every report, and any included
recommendation, and determines the appropriate discipline for any violation
of the Personal Conduct Policy.28
Following a determination that disciplinary action must be taken, the
player in question is notified and given an opportunity to appeal the
disciplinary measures.29 Appeals are heard according to Article 46 of the
NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, which grants the Commissioner

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 1.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
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authority to hear appeals regarding “any action taken against a player by the
Commissioner for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public
confidence in, the game of professional football.” 30 Alternatively, the
Commissioner may appoint any arbitrator to hear the appeal, with no
requirement that he consult with the executive committee or the NFLPA. 31
Hearings are completed following a discovery process in which both the
League and the player, or their representative, exchange any materials on
which they intend to rely.32 A decision is then rendered as to whether the
disciplinary action is to be affirmed, reduced, or vacated altogether.33 All
decisions of this process are delivered in writing to the interested parties, and
are binding upon the parties as the final disposition of the dispute in the eyes
of the NFL and the Collective Bargaining Agreement.34
C.

Governing Laws of the National Football League
1. The Collective Bargaining Agreement
Article 2 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the NFL

and the NFL Players Association (NFLPA), the union certified to bargain on
behalf of the players of the NFL, contains a Governing Agreement.35 This
section of the agreement provides that the CBA will:
[S]upersede any conflicting provisions in the Settlement
Agreement, NFL Player Contract, the NFL Constitution and
Bylaws, the NFL Rules, or any other document affecting terms and
conditions of employment of NFL players, and all players, Clubs,

30

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE AND NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT, Art 46, §1(a) (Aug. 4, 2011).
31
Id. at art. 46, § 2(a).
32
Id. at art. 46, § 2(f)(ii).
33
Id. at art. 46, § 2(d).
34
Id. at art. 46, § 2(d).
35
Id. at art. 2.
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the NFLPA, the NFL, and the Management Council will be bound
hereby.36
By including this provision, the NFL and the NFLPA agreed that the CBA
should be the governing document representing the relationship between the
League and the players, and it should supersede any conflicting rules or
statements in any of the NFL’s other governing documents. Article 2 defines
the scope of the CBA as well, cementing that the CBA represents the
“complete understanding of the parties on all subjects covered [t]herein, and
there will be no change in the terms and conditions of [the] Agreement
without mutual consent.”37 This section of the Governing Agreement goes on
to stipulate that “the parties waive all rights to bargain with one another
concerning any subject covered or not covered” by the CBA. Additionally,
the Constitution and Bylaws of the NFL, Section 4(a) insists that if any
proposed change to the Constitution or Bylaws “could significantly affect the
terms and conditions of employment of NFL players,” the NFL must give
notice to the NFLPA and “negotiate the change in good faith.”38 Section 4(b)
further explains the process for solving disputes over whether a proposed
change would have a “significant” effect or whether the parties engaged in
good faith negotiations.39
Non-injury grievances not covered under other sections of the CBA, and
not resolved by an answer from the non-filing party, are to be heard by an
arbitrator under Article 43 of the CBA. 40 Article 43 prescribes that an
arbitration panel, comprised of four arbitrators whose appointments must be
accepted by both the NFL and the NFLPA, will serve to hear, individually,
appeals to grievances.41 Decisions by a member of the arbitration panel are

36
37
38
39
40
41

Id. at art. 2, § 1.
Id. at art. 2, § 4(a).
Id.
Id. at art 2, § 4(b).
Id.
Id. at art 43, § 6.
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binding under the CBA, but the authority of each arbitrator is limited. 42
Arbitrators do not have the ability to alter the provisions of the CBA in any
way.43 They can only grant remedies in the form of
a money award, an order of reinstatement, suspension without
pay, a stay of suspension pending decision, a cease and desist order,
a credit or benefit award under the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL
Player Retirement Plan, or an order of compliance with a specific
term of this Agreement or any other applicable document, or an
advisory opinion pursuant to Article 50, Section 1(c).44
While limited in scope, this provision could potentially allow a member of
the arbitration panel to, in the event of a finding that the proposed rule change
would have a “significant” effect on the terms and conditions of a player’s
employment, insist that the NFL bargain in good faith with the NFLPA.
Where Article 43 concerns non-injury grievances, Article 46 covers
Commissioner discipline and the process of appealing disciplinary
decisions.45 As previously explained, the Commissioner ultimately has
complete discretion regarding discipline for “conduct detrimental to the
integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football,” on
and off of the field.46 Further, while Article 46 directs the Commissioner to
consult with the Executive Director of the NFLPA when appointing a hearing
officer for appeals under Section 1(a), “the Commissioner may serve as the
hearing officer in any appeal under Section 1(a) of [Article 46] at his
discretion.”47 Allowing the Commissioner to determine both the punishment

42
43
44
45
46
47

Id. at art 43, § 8.
Id.
Id.
See generally id. at art. 46.
Id. at art. 46, § 1(a).
Id. at art. 46, § 2(a).

VOLUME 18 • ISSUE 2 • 2020

623

624 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

and its fairness has led extensive litigation, illustrating the importance of
implementing the changes this article suggests.48
2. The Constitution and Bylaws of the NFL
While ultimate authority over the NFL and its players is vested in the CBA,
the Constitution and Bylaws, to which the NFL member teams are also
bound, are relevant authorities to the extent that they do not conflict with the
CBA.49 To that end, the Constitution and Bylaws contain in them a covenant
requiring all membership clubs to “include in every contract between any
member club and its employees, including coaches and players, a clause
wherein the parties to such contract agree to be bound by the Constitution
and Bylaws of the League.”50
As noted earlier, the Constitution and the and Bylaws vest the
Commissioner with the power to appoint committees when the League deems
it necessary and appropriate.51 Additionally, the Commissioner has the power
to direct and serve as the chairman of those committees he appoints at his
discretion, and he serves as an “ex-officio” member of each committee.52
While the Commissioner may, or may not, participate as an active member
of each committee, it is important to note that all committee members are
appointed by, and serve at the direction of, the Commissioner.
Additionally, the Constitution and Bylaws further cement the authority of
the Commissioner as judge, jury, and executioner. Of the many powers
granted to the Commissioner by the Constitution and Bylaws, one is the
authority to arbitrate any dispute that involves “a member or members in the
48

See generally Eric L. Einhorn, Between the Hash Marks: The Absolute Power the NFL’s
Collective Bargaining Agreement Grants Its Commissioner, 89 BROOK. L. REV. 393
(2016).
49
See NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE AND NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT, at art. 2, § 1.
50
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE, art. III, §3.11(D) (rev. 2006).
51
Id. at art. VI, § 6.7.
52
Id.
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League or any players or employees of the members of the League or any
combination thereof that in the opinion of the Commissioner constitutes
conduct detrimental to the best interests of the League or professional
football,” similar to Article 46 of the CBA. 53 The Constitution and Bylaws
again grant disciplinary power to the Commissioner, stating that
[w]henever the Commissioner, after notice and hearing, decides
that an owner, shareholder, partner or holder of an interest in a
member club, or any player, coach, officer, director, or employee
thereof, or an officer, employee or official of the League has either
violated the Constitution and Bylaws of the League or has been or
is guilty of conduct detrimental to the welfare of the League or
professional football, then the Commissioner shall have complete
authority to: (1) Suspend and/or fine such person… and/or (2)
Cancel any contract or agreement of such person with the League or
with any member thereof.54
While this provision appears to grant similar powers to those under Article
46 of the CBA, it also seems to require a hearing prior to any fine or
suspension. To date, it does not appear that a challenge has been made to the
Commissioner’s authority with regard to this section of the Constitution and
Bylaws, however, such a requirement seems to conflict with the CBA given
the supremacy clause referenced above.
3. The Personal Conduct Policy: League Policies for Players
In 2016, the NFL published an updated Personal Conduct Policy (PCP),
which stated that “[i]t is a privilege to be part of the National Football
League. Everyone who is part of the League must refrain from ‘conduct
detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in’ the NFL.” 55 The PCP
purports to be issued pursuant to the Commissioner’s authority granted under
the CBA and the Constitution and Bylaws of the NFL in an attempt to
53
54
55

Id. at art. VIII, § 8.3(e).
Id. at art. VII, § 8.13(a)(1), (2).
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 1.
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“address and sanction conduct detrimental to the League and professional
football.”56 The PCP goes on to state that players who have been convicted
of a crime, or who are subject to a “disposition of a criminal proceeding” as
defined therein, can be disciplined, making it clear that not being convicted
of a crime is not grounds to avoid discipline from the NFL.57 The PCP then
provides a list of fourteen categories, which are not exhaustive and under
which punishable player conduct might fall.58 Most of the infractions listed
are at least somewhat vague, none the least of which is the final one, which
reads as follows: “Conduct that undermines or puts at risk the integrity of the
NFL, NFL clubs, or NFL personnel.”59 The NFL, guided by the
Commissioner, thus created a vague standard that allows for great discretion
when determining what type of conduct is prohibited under the terminology
“detrimental to the integrity” of the League.
As stated previously, when a player is suspected of breaching the PCP, an
investigation is initiated, the length and breadth of which are determined by
the circumstances and the Commissioner’s direction.60 Discipline, following
a determination of a violation, can include a fine, a probationary period
requiring terms to be met before reinstatement, suspension for a fixed or
indefinite term, banishment from the League with an opportunity to reapply,
or termination of a contract.61 Following a rise in public incidents of domestic
violence, the PCP now includes baseline disciplinary measures of suspension
for six games and a fine for first-time offenders of violent crimes such as
assault, sexual assault, and domestic violence, with permanent banishment
upon a second offense.62 This baseline is the only specific punishment
outlined in the PCP, essentially leaving punishment for all other offenses to
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. at 1.
Id. at 5,
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5
Id. at 7.
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be determined by the Commissioner as he sees fit.63 The vague wording and
permissive discretion granted by the PCP, in addition to the CBA and the
Constitution and Bylaws, have caused multiple problems leading to litigation
over decisions by the Commissioner and his appointed appeals officers.64
Given the examples below, some form of correction to these controlling
documents and the structure provided therein is clearly needed.
D.

Problems with the Rulemaking Process
The NFL’s response to the National Anthem protests led by players in the

2016 and 2017 seasons serves as the most recent, relevant, and polarizing
example of the failings of the existing rule-making process.
On August 14th, 2016, San Francisco 49ers backup quarterback Colin
Kaepernick sat for the National Anthem to protest police-involved shootings
of unarmed African Americans and to show support for the Black Lives
Matter movement.65 When asked for an explanation for his actions,
Kaepernick initially stated, “I am not going to stand up to show pride in a
flag for a country that oppresses black people and people of color.”66
Following a conversation with former Green Beret and short-time NFL long
snapper Nate Boyer, Kaepernick began kneeling for the National Anthem as
a sign of respect to veterans, active service members, and those who have
sacrificed their lives for the United States.67 As the NFL regular season began
in 2016, more players began to kneel for the National Anthem across the
League.68 As more players began to kneel for the Anthem during the 2017
season, President Donald Trump took to Twitter to disparage players and call

63
64
65
66
67
68

Id.
See Einhorn, supra note 48.
Coaston, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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for a boycott of the NFL.69 The president’s derisive comments both on
Twitter and at a rally in Alabama served only to galvanize the movement
among players.70 Since August of 2016, approximately 200 players have
displayed some form of protest during the National Anthem.71
In response to two years of anthem protests and growing discord between
critics and advocates of the movement, the NFL attempted to institute a new
policy on the national anthem before the 2018 pre-season.72 Players have only
been required to be on the field for the anthem since the 2009 season.73 Until
2018, however, the policy did not mandate that players stand or show respect
for the anthem ceremony in any specific way.74 In May 2018, the NFL
announced a drastic policy change, which allowed players to stay in the
locker room or come on to the field for the national anthem, but required all
personnel on the field to “stand and show respect for the flag and the
anthem.”75 The new policy instituted fines for teams whose personnel
protested during the anthem, and allowed teams to set internal disciplinary
measures for players who chose to protest.76 Additionally, the Commissioner
was granted authority to “impose appropriate discipline on League personnel
who do not stand and show respect for the flag and the anthem.”77
69

Mark Sandritter, A Timeline of Colin Kaepernick’s National Anthem Protest and the
Athletes Who Joined Him, SBNATION (Sep. 25, 2017, 10:26 AM),
https://www.sbnation.com/2016/9/11/12869726/colin-kaepernick-national-anthemprotest-seahawks-brandon-marshall-nfl [https://perma.cc/7V8W-X5M5].
70
Id.
71
Coaston, supra note 2.
72
Christian D’Andrea & Adam Stites, NFL Owners Reach a ‘Compromise’ About the
National Anthem. How Bad is It?, SBNATION (May 24, 2018, 5:58 PM),
https://www.sbnation.com/2018/5/23/17368782/nfl-national-anthem-protests-ruleannual-spring-meeting [https://perma.cc/NTW6-RBHT].
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, Roger Goodell’s Statement on National Anthem
Policy (May 23, 2018, 1:15 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000933962/
article/roger-goodells-statement-on-national-anthem-policy [https://perma.cc/37ZMQW6D].
76
Id.
77
Id.
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Backlash against the new policy was immediate and strong among players
and fans alike.78 As details emerged, it was clear that, although the NFL was
touting the new policy as a compromise, there had been no attempt to work
with players or the NFLPA to create it.79 Rather, the new policy was a
“compromise” among owners.80 To that end, during the annual meeting of
the NFL executive committee, a formal vote was not even taken after a debate
of the proposed rule, and only one team owner did not consent to the
proposal.81
Following the institution of the new Anthem Policy, the NFLPA filed a
non-injury grievance under Article 43 of the CBA, challenging the rule. 82
While the grievance was filed more than a month after the institution of the
new policy, the NFLPA planned to go through the arbitration process,
encouraging the NFL to come to the table and negotiate a better policy.83 The
NFL eventually determined, because of public backlash and mounting
pressure, that the best course of action was to not enforce the new policy. 84
Two months after instituting the Anthem Policy, the NFL released a joint
statement with the NFLPA announcing that no new rules regarding the
anthem would be introduced or enforced until both parties came to an
agreement regarding the anthem protests.85 As illustrated here, the process by
which the NFL made decisions regarding the creation and implementation of

78

D’Andrea & Stites, supra note 72.
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Charles R. McDonald, The NFLPA Filed a Grievance Over the NFL’s New Anthem
Policy,
SBNATION
(Jul.
10,
2018,
12:11
PM),
https://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2018/7/10/17553606/nfl-anthem-policy-protest-playersunion-nflpa-grievance [https://perma.cc/MLP2-VYQ6].
83
Id.
84
Adam Stites, What the NFL’s Halted Anthem Policy Means for the Players, Teams, and
League,
SBNATION
(Sep.
9,
2018,
12:20
PM),
https://www.sbnation.com/2018/7/23/17596078/nfl-national-anthem-policy-ramifications
[https://perma.cc/C8PD-6CQD].
85
Id.
79
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the Anthem Policy, a player conduct rule, was deeply flawed and set up the
League for impending arbitration and potential litigation.
E.

Recent Enforcement Issues
1. Deflategate
Perhaps one of the most famous instances of contested discipline was the

suspension of New England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady in the wake of
the “Deflategate” scandal. During the 2015 season, Tom Brady and the
Patriots were accused of deflating footballs below the level allowed by the
NFL rules.86 At the conclusion of an investigation conducted by an NFL
Executive Vice President and the NFL general council, an official
determination was made that it was “more probable than not that Brady was
at least generally aware of the inappropriate activities.”87 Following this
finding, the Commissioner decided that Brady’s actions were detrimental to
the integrity of the League and instituted disciplinary actions against him
under Article 46 of the CBA.88 After appointing an arbitrator who issued
Brady a four-game suspension, likely at the Commissioner’s direction, the
Commissioner appointed himself to hear Brady’s appeal and upheld the
suspension.89 Brady and the NFLPA appealed his suspension to federal court
and the disciplinary decision was vacated as “fundamentally unfair” in
violation of the Federal Arbitration Act.90 This ruling was eventually
overturned on appeal, where the court stated that the court’s only job under
these circumstances was to determine whether the Commissioner had acted
within the confines of the CBA.91 The court did, however, note that the
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powers granted to the Commissioner under Article 46, effectively making
him judge, jury, and executioner, were “unorthodox.”92
Irrespective of Brady’s guilt in this situation, it is clear from the sheer
quantity of negative press and money spent on litigation within the NFL and
federal courts that the Commissioner’s power to determine wrongdoing,
assign discipline, and then uphold his own rulings creates a situation rife with
potential conflicts. Each step of the way, the Commissioner is incentivized
to act as only he sees fit, and as a result, he will never have a reason to
overturn his own decisions barring extreme circumstances.
2. The Domestic Violence Issue
Another galvanizing moment surrounding enforcement problems in the
NFL accompanied a rise in domestic violence cases involving NFL players.
The two most famous incidents, analyzed below, took place before the 2016
revision of the PCP and were mired in conflict due to inconsistent
punishments handed out by the Commissioner.
In February of 2015, Ray Rice, a running back for the Baltimore Ravens,
was arrested, charged with simple assault, and released. 93 After pleading not
guilty to harsher charges of aggravated assault, Rice was allowed to enter a
program for first-time offenders, which allowed him to avoid jail time
provided he stayed out of trouble.94 Following a meeting with the team
owner, the Commissioner, League officials, other personnel, and Rice’s now
wife, Rice was given a two-game suspension.95 When the League received
public backlash for the light sentence, the Commissioner implemented the
current League policy, which mandates fines and a six-game suspension
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without pay for first offenders.96 Following the release of another video
showing the brutality of the assault, the Ravens terminated Rice’s contract,
and the Commissioner suspended him indefinitely.97 Rice appealed the
Commissioner’s decision, and upon completion of an investigation by a
neutral third-party, an independent arbitrator overturned Rice’s indefinite
suspension on grounds that Rice had not misled the Commissioner prior to
receiving the two-game suspension.98
Around the same time, running back Adrian Peterson was charged with
“felony reckless or negligent injury of a child” and was placed on the
Commissioner’s “exempt list,” where he remained after taking a plea deal
which reduced the charges to a misdemeanor.99 A player on the
Commissioner’s exempt list cannot play in games or participate in on-thefield practices, but can participate in non-football team activities.100
Following the granting of a hearing to decide whether discipline would be
imposed for a violation of the NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy, the
Commissioner imposed punishment on Peterson based on the new policy of
discipline which arose out of the incident involving Ray Rice. 101 Peterson’s
punishment included an unpaid suspension, a fine, and counselling with an
NFL-designated therapist.102 When the NFLPA appealed Peterson’s
discipline, the Commissioner recused himself at their request, but appointed
an arbitrator with whom he had close ties. 103 Despite the apparent conflict of
interest, the appointed arbitrator did not recuse himself and found against
Peterson, ruling that the Commissioner’s decision was consistent with both
the CBA and the new domestic violence policy.104 This decision was
96
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appealed to federal court and overturned on grounds that the arbitrator, in
upholding the Commissioner’s disciplinary measures, was “enforcing his
own sense of justice outside of the bounds of the established CBA.”105
Both of these cases, abhorrent on their faces, have served as black marks
upon the NFL. Ratings and public opinion of the League and the
Commissioner were very low following the eventual disposition of the
cases.106 The NFL’s attempt to correct the issue by implementing new policy
was too little, too late for a public who had already identified and condemned
the internal inconsistencies. Another unfortunate side effect of these cases
was that the failings of the NFL’s Commissioner’s discipline were put on full
display. Giving carte blanche power to one person and expecting an efficient
and impartial result has failed, as demonstrated by the Rice and Peterson
discrepancies.

II.
SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS IN RULEMAKING AND
ENFORCEMENT
A.

New Rulemaking Committees
As stated above, there are two rulemaking committees relevant to the

proposed rule changes in this article, the Competition Committee and the
Conduct Committee. Currently, the members of these committees are chosen
by the Commissioner pursuant to the Constitution and Bylaws of the NFL.107
All members of the Competition Committee are either team owners,
executives, or coaches currently employed by teams.108 As such, while
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coaches, and to some degree general managers, have a reason to protect
players from unfair rules, there is an inherent conflict of interest among these
groups, as they are paid by owners, who are in turn members of the NFL
Executive. While the Anthem Policy failure was mostly a product of
bargaining amongst the Executive Committee, the Competition Committee,
had it been involved, would still have run up against the potential issue of not
having consulted the NFLPA, since there is no player or union representative
on the Committee. Frequently, rules of play, such as the “catch rule,” and
multiple iterations of policy governing allowable touchdown celebrations
have caused problems with both referee interpretation and public opinion. 109
The illegality of certain celebrations still falls under a “know it when you see
it” standard.110 Further, rules advanced by the current rulemaking committees
have led to player confusion, unfair fines, and even injury concerns for
players.111 While there are certainly issues that would not be resolved no
matter what group of people make up the competition committee, the
individuals in charge cannot be said to have a player-first mentality. In fact,
given their income source, it would be hard to argue that, when player rights
should be a concern, those rights will fall anywhere close to the top priority
for the current committee.
Similarly, the Conduct Committee is currently made up entirely of
majority owners, their children, and minority owners of NFL member
teams.112 By and large, as with the domestic violence policy issue, the
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Conduct Committee, and therefore the NFL, has been behind the ball. For
example, until quarterback Michael Vic was charged with animal cruelty in
2007, and subsequently suspended for detrimental conduct, the PCP did not
include specific language regarding animal cruelty or the like.113 While it is
certainly impossible that any committee members could foresee every
possible contingency that might arise, an argument could be made that, as it
exists, the conduct committee has an incentive to maintain language in the
PCP that is vague and leaves broad discretion to the Commissioner.
First, vague language allows the Commissioner to declare almost any
conduct, on- or off-the-field, detrimental to the integrity of and public
confidence in the NFL. A good example of this would be the discipline
handed down to Tom Brady for the “Deflategate” scandal. While Brady was
found to be complicit in violating a gameplay rule, he was disciplined for
detrimental conduct.114 While there was certainly public outcry over the
incident, given that underinflation of footballs is a violation of an in-game
rule, appropriate punishments according to competition rules must have been,
or at least should have been, in existence.
Second, like the Competition Committee, the Conduct Committee is
appointed by the Commissioner and serves at his direction.115Also like the
Competition Committee, the owner members that make up the Conduct
Committee are incentivized to empower the Commissioner in order to
maintain their positions of power, and to attempt to ensure that the NFL
executive retains power over player employees. Relinquishing control over
what is considered detrimental to the League would remove some of the
Commissioner’s power to impose discipline in any circumstance wherein he
believes the League needs to be protected or that he needs to appease
113
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ownership interests. While League protection should certainly be a concern
for any member of the Conduct Committee going forward, the current
members of the Committee have no incentive to protect player rights.
In response to the obvious conflicts existing on both the Competition
Committee and the Conduct Committee, new structures of membership
should be written into the Constitution and Bylaws of the NFL and the CBA.
For the Competition Committee, a nine-member committee format should be
implemented with three representatives appointed by the NFL; three
appointed by the NFLPA; two coaches proposed by the Executive Committee
and approved by both the NFL and the NFLPA; and one outside member to
serve as a tiebreaker, recommended by the NFLPA and approved by the NFL.
In this situation, the interests of all parties should be represented fairly.
The NFL would protect its interests by having a voice to promote marketable
gameplay, and the players would be protected by representatives from the
NFLPA. Likewise, owners would be protected by representation from the
NFL. The coaches’ representatives should similarly fairly represent their
teams. Those coaches, on a board that is comprised of a more equal
membership, would have less incentive to bow to the wishes of ownership,
as the committees themselves would not operate at the direction of the
Commissioner. Instead, they would be directed by the Constitution and
Bylaws to review and supplement the current competition rules to improve
rule clarity, quality of gameplay, and player safety. These directives, and
freedom from strict League-based interests, should allow coaches to assist in
making and improving rules so that they can coach more easily and fairly
represent players and owners alike.
Regarding the member appointed from outside the NFL and NFLPA, this
final vote would reasonably serve as both a potential tiebreaker concerning
difficult rules and an objective voice to moderate between the interests of the
League and the players association. This member would be nominated by the
NFLPA and approved by the NFL to ensure that both sides are satisfied with
the representation and that the voice will be an unbiased one. Allowing the
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NFLPA to nominate the member would ensure that the party with less power
is not coerced into approving a biased selection. Parallel to the current
compensation system for appeals officers for on-the-field violations, this
committee member’s necessary expenses should be payed equally by the
NFL and the NFLPA to safeguard against any monetary coercion.
Similar to the proposed structure of the Competition Committee, the
Conduct Committee should be altered to have two representatives from the
NFL, two from the NFLPA, and a final member, again proposed by the
players association and approved by the NFL. While many of the same
concerns regarding impartiality would be cured by this structure, both parties
should have a greater vested interest in having a Conduct Committee
comprised fairly, with outside impartial assistance. The fifth member of the
Committee should ideally be an individual with a background in the law or
judiciary, to maintain a level eye towards avoiding potential litigation. This
fifth member should be compensated for their work and have necessary
expenses funded by both the NFL and NFLPA equally. While it is of course
impossible to foresee every infraction that might arise in the future, a fifth
member with a legal background, who is compensated for their time, would
have the necessary knowledge and independence to assist in clarifying and
detailing baseline punishments for more specific infractions of player
conduct.
As such, the Conduct Committee’s mission, to be written in the
Constitution and Bylaws, should not be directed by the Commissioner, but to
clarify and create rules to ensure player understanding and a fair but strict
code for player conduct to ensure the integrity of and public trust in the NFL.
This mission statement would direct Conduct Committee members to flesh
out disciplinary guidelines that are less arbitrary and more tailored to specific
types of conduct. While some vague language is necessary to allow for
consideration of unforeseen conduct, eliminating the guesswork for players
and the NFL alike would not only help to avoid arbitration and potential
litigation, but hopefully further incentivize players to avoid specific behavior.
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B.

A New Disciplinary Board
There has been a great deal of criticism aimed at the Commissioner of the

NFL for his ability to determine when an infraction has taken place, assign
disciplinary measures, and uphold his own judgments regarding conduct
considered detrimental to the NFL.116 While the measures suggested above
to alter the composition and directive of the Conduct Committee should
eliminate a great deal of discretion afforded to the final disciplinarian,
elimination of all discretion would make a determination of punishment for
unforeseen detrimental conduct all but impossible. As such, like the
redistribution of influence in the rule-making committees this article
previously proposed, Article 46 of the CBA should be amended or replaced
to vest disciplinary power for conduct in a three-member panel instead of the
Commissioner. This panel would be comprised of one representative each
from the NFL and the NFLPA, and one member appointed in the same
manner as the proposed outside appointees of the Competition and Conduct
Committees. Like the Conduct Committee, this third disciplinary board
member should have a legal background to ensure clarity of decisions and an
eye for both proper process and potential future issues. Similarly, this
member should be compensated equally by both parties.
Divesting disciplinary power from the sole control of the Commissioner in
this way should serve to perform two functions. First, it would eliminate the
existing bias inherent in the Commissioner’s position towards Leaguefriendly or team-friendly results by including a representative who would
advocate for the players’ best interests. Additionally, an outside
representative would provide an impartial, unbiased view so long as the
representative is chosen and compensated in the manner proposed. Second, a
panel like the one suggested would provide more than a single voice or
rationale to appropriately decide highly controversial disputes that will
necessarily arise. Implementing these specific changes would be aimed at
116
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protecting both the NFL and the player’s rights while maintaining an
ultimately unbiased decision-making process. These changes should also
lead to fewer appeals and less litigation outside of the NFL itself.
Because Article 46 allows for the appointment of arbitrators by the
Commissioner to hear appeals of disciplinary actions, that article should
further be amended to create a group of independent arbitrators for this
function. A pool of four arbitrators should be created, maintaining the same
powers as currently given, with two representatives being chosen by the NFL
and NFLPA, respectively, along with the added requirement that each be
approved by the other party. In the event of an appeal, an arbitrator would be
chosen at random to hear the appeal and make a final, binding decision. All
four arbitrators should be compensated equally by the NFL and the NFLPA
to avoid any allegiance due to the source of their income. The requirements
that each arbitrator be approved by the non-selecting party, and paid equally
by both, should help to ensure that both the NFL and the NFLPA are
incentivized to select qualified, unbiased arbitrators. Further, the added
provision of random assignment to hearings should remove any motivation
to select a biased arbitrator, as there is no guarantee that that arbitrator will
preside over any given hearing. Like divesting the Commissioner of original
disciplinary power, further removing his ability to hear appeals necessarily
removes an interested individual’s inherent bias and provides for a more
equal and impartial panel to hear appeals. While this process will not
guarantee the satisfaction of a party who receives an unfavorable outcome, it
will at least likely reduce the possibility of having an arbitrator’s ruling
overturned for attempting to enforce their own ideals of justice outside the
bounds of the CBA and governing documents, as in Adrian Peterson’s
case.117
This newfound neutrality among the disciplinary committee and
arbitrators will also work to benefit both the NFL and the NFLPA. While the
117
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current system protects the interest of the NFL in the sense that the
Commissioner may always act in a manner that he believes will best benefit
his employer, having an impartial and expanded disciplinary process should
ultimately lead to fewer disputed rulings based on biased arbitrators or
disciplinarians. Among others, one benefit of this change will be to protect
the image of the NFL from negative media circus surrounding litigation like
that of “Deflategate,” or the cases of Adrian Peterson and Ray Rice, by
following a process that respects the rights and interests of both sides while
publicly representing a comprehensive and unbiased process.
C.

Implementation
As discussed above, the proposed changes would necessitate changes in

the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Constitution and Bylaws of the
NFL, and the Personal Conduct Policy. In the case of the CBA, in order to
implement a new disciplinary structure for non-football detrimental conduct,
Article 46 must be amended or replaced with a similar article vesting those
powers in the disciplinary panel and the group of four arbitrators proposed
by this article. While these changes represent a large-scale change to the way
the disciplinary process is currently handled for these matters, the overall
change to the CBA would be minimal in that it would only affect Article 46.
Further, the matters of notice and process would remain relatively unchanged
except for the changes in who will be hearing matters.
Another necessary change to the CBA is the addition of provisions
allowing for the creation of the proposed new forms of both the Competition
Committee and the Conduct Committee. Currently, both committees were
created under the powers of the Commissioner granted by the Constitution
and Bylaws.118 There is no provision in the CBA that allows for committees
to be created, and the NFLPA has no power to change the Constitution and
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Bylaws of the NFL. Additional provisions must be added to the CBA in order
to effect change that is binding on both parties, and over which both parties
have a measure of control. The restructured committees and their directives
should therefore be implemented into the CBA.
Likewise, the Constitution and Bylaws must be edited to remove
committee creation power from the Commissioner with respect to the two
newly independent committees. The NFL executive may wish to vest the
Commissioner with the power to appoint the NFL’s members of the newly
created committees; to choose two independent arbitrators for the arbitration
panel; and to accept or deny submissions by the NFLPA regarding the
independent members of the competition committee, the conduct committee,
and the disciplinary board. Such would be acceptable under the system
proposed here. The corresponding provision would then be incorporated with
an amendment to the Commissioner’s power under the Constitution and
Bylaws. Finally, the disciplinary power granted to the Commissioner under
the Constitution and Bylaws would necessarily be changed to exclude
discipline of players for detrimental conduct. Member teams, executives, and
coaches may continue to entrust this power to the Commissioner, but as they
are well represented by the Executive Committee, which has the power to
remove the Commissioner, they do not share the same concerns and effects
of bias that players do.
With regard to the Personal Conduct Policy, changes to the structure and
mission of the Conduct Committee would necessitate drastic changes over
time. The provisions detailing discipline, derivation of powers, and the
structure and mission of the Conduct Committee would be amended, and as
the Committee performed its functions, definitions of infractions and
baseline disciplinary measures would be expanded. Further, the procedures
taken from Article 46 of the CBA would have to be altered to reflect the
changes made therein.
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D.

Potential Conflict
While there are clear benefits to both the NFL and the NFLPA to make the

changes suggested in this article, there is also a clear road to conflict should
these changes be proposed. Article 2 of the CBA allows for good faith
negotiation of proposed changes to the CBA and the Constitution and Bylaws
and insists on negotiations for any changes the NFL wishes to make that may
significantly alter the conditions of players’ employment. 119 The NFL,
however, would likely push back on ceding any of the powers suggested to
even a neutral source. Currently, the Commissioner, who is an employee of
the NFL, and removable by the Executive Committee, has every incentive to
protect the interests of team owners and the League. Whether his actions are
in the best interest of players or their rights is of little concern to the NFL as
a business. The Commissioner would likely argue that as the man in charge
of the NFL itself, he will act in the best interest of the NFL with respect to
disputes that are inward- and outward-facing. The fact of the matter is,
however, that the Commissioner and the League have been consistently
unable to handle the responsibilities of rulemaking and discipline, both onand off-the-field, without blowback from players and fans alike.
Currently, the failed Anthem Policy implemented in May 2018 remains on
the books but unenforced under the agreement between the NFL and the
NFLPA.120 Given that players are continuing to protest, and there is no
resolution between the NFL and the NFLPA, the League continues to face
backlash from both sides of the debate. Similarly, the Commissioner and the
League have failed to respond quickly or appropriately to scandals such as
“Deflategate” and the domestic violence issues that have plagued the League.
Public trust and viewership ratings were negatively affected by all of these
issues, and yet the NFL continues to insist on vesting all power in the hands
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of one individual. As such, it is unlikely that the League will choose to agree
to bargain and amend the CBA.
However, despite the fact that the League and Executive Committee will
likely not bargain with the NFLPA before the expiration of the current CBA,
the NFLPA still has options. The current CBA expires after the 2020 League
year, which means that before the 2021 season a new CBA must be bargained
and agreed upon. Prior to that time, any rules, such as the Anthem Policy,
should absolutely be challenged under the provisions of Article 2 of the CBA.
Further, the NFLPA must prepare to vigorously bargain for the changes
suggested above. While the process of creating the next CBA will largely
center around monetary concerns, a great deal of the conflict between players
and the League since the adoption of the current CBA has centered around
issues of discipline and Commissioner control. The current structure allows
for the Commissioner to all but ignore players’ rights in determining what is
best for the NFL. This practice cannot continue to be tolerated. The issue with
presenting these changes as a bargaining point, however, is that during the
bargaining process, one often has to give something to get something. Given
current player dissatisfaction, it is not altogether impossible that a potential
strike may loom large over the next bargaining process, but this is primarily
for monetary reasons. For example, the NFL should consider the incentives
for altering the CBA explained above, but in doing so the League would
almost certainly demand a concession of some sort in order to agree to
implement these changes. This likely means a sacrifice of some potential
financial gains in order to preserve the player protections sought here. The
NFLPA should, however, lean on the negative optics that have recently
plagued the League. Continuous publicized problems with player conduct,
and the League’s negative treatment of players being disclosed to the public,
will only damage the reputation of the League in years to come. More lenient
and player-friendly leagues like the NHL and NBA may stand to take market
share away from the NFL should these trends continue. As such, while the
NFL may request monetary concessions from players, the NFLPA should be
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prepared to remind the League just how much it stands to lose should the
League’s public image continue to move in a negative direction.
While players may be hesitant to agree to lessen their fiscal demands, and
thereby gains, it is important to remember that changes in rules and the
discretionary whims of the Commissioner are frequently costly to players’
rights and their wallets. Changes implemented on the field, and the vague
language of the PCP, can arbitrarily cost players money in fines due to
unclear and poorly considered rules, such as the Anthem Policy or the
recently implemented changes to the “roughing the passer” rule. These rules
are currently implemented with little to no input from the NFLPA. With no
voice in the process of rulemaking or adjudication procedures, players will
continue to find themselves marginalized and without protection from a
system that has no internal—and as yet little external—desire to change.

III.

CONCLUSION

As explained in this article, the current NFL structures for rulemaking and
enforcement of existing rules is deeply flawed. Players continue to be subject
to vague and poorly written rules and standards of conduct on and off the
field, and with each new conflict that arises, the NFL and its Commissioner
have only managed to meet the minimum threshold for competency. Added
to this, the inherent conflicts of interest that plague members of the
Competition Committee, the Conduct Committee, and the Commissioner
himself as both disciplinarian and arbitrator serve only to create an inefficient
and biased system that continues to struggle. Given the benefits of creating
the new rules committees illustrated here, the NFLPA and the NFL should
both be incentivized to change. The benefits of improvements in rule clarity
and the potential enhancements to gameplay and player safety far outweigh
those of maintaining strict league control over the rulemaking process.
Likewise, the issues arising from complete Commissioner control over the
disciplinary process has led to litigation and a litany of public image issues,
which cannot be sustained. As such, changes like those proposed in this
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article must be implemented for the sake of players’ rights and interests and
to protect the NFL from itself. Any outside observer can see the harsh
detriments to league integrity and its public image that have occurred due to
a flawed system of disciplinary actions. These consequences, coupled with a
consistent disrespect for players perpetrated by the NFL in the public eye,
necessitate the changes advocated herein. Changes must be made for the
benefit of professional football, its players, the League, and its fans.
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